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NOTE 
VIOLENCE IN THE COURTS: 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ATTEMPT TO 
GRAPPLE WITH AND PIN DOWN 
WHAT IS A "CRIME OF VIOLENCE" IN 
UNITED STATES v. SERNA 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are arrested while in possession of a ftrearm, and you 
plead guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.c. § 922(g)(l).1 Several years 
earlier, you pled guilty to being in possession of a sawed-off shotgun in 
violation of a state statute criminalizing the possession of such weapons. 2 
The government now seeks to enhance your sentence for the § 922(g)( 1) 
violation by asking the district court to classify your previous state-court 
conviction as one for a "crime of violence.,,3 Under current law, if the 
I 18 V.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2007) (providing: "[ilt shaH be unlawful for any person 
who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."). 
2 A sawed-off shotgun is a shotgun, or a weapon made from a shotgun, that has been 
modified to have a shortened barrel of less than eighteen inches in length. See 26 V.S.C.A. § 
5485(a) (West 2007); see also Cal. Pen. Code § 12020(c)(1) (2006); Cal. Pen. Code § 12001.5 
(2006). 
3 See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.l(a)(4)(A) (2006) (applying a Base Level Offense of 20 if "the 
defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction 
of either a crime of violence or a controHed substance offense"); see V.S.S.G. § 4BI.2 (2006) 
(defining "crime of violence" as "any offense under federal or state law, punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that ... has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
541 
1
Cho: What Is a Crime of Violence
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2007
542 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
indictment, charging papers, or the written plea agreement are available 
in the record, the district court may find that the state-court conviction 
constitutes a crime of violence and double your sentence.4 However, if 
the record does not contain the aforementioned documents, the district 
court will find the state-court conviction is not a crime of violence and 
your sentence will remain at the base level for the current offense. 5 As 
the above hypothetical demonstrates, a court's determination of whether 
an offense is a violent crime can significantly impact the length of 
sentencing for convicted defendants,6 and possibly result in "two- and 
threefold increases in their presumptive sentences, often as a result of 
convictions that are quite old, and for which they originally received 
little or no jail time." 7 
Xavier Serna pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a fIrearm. 8 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that Serna's prior 
conviction of possession of an assault weapon was a conviction of a 
crime of violence for sentence enhancement purposes.9 The court held 
that Serna's state-court conviction for possession of an assault weapon, 10 
in violation of California Penal Code § 12280(b), was not for a crime of 
violence, and the conviction could not be used as a sentence 
enhancement. II This decision hinged on the lack of documentation 
available to the Ninth Circuit regarding the underlying facts of Serna's 
previous state-court conviction. 12 Without more information, the Ninth 
Circuit could only consider the statutory definition of the crime in 
determining whether possession of an assault weapon constituted a crime 
of violence for sentencing purposes. 13 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or ... otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."). 
4 See United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying the sentencing 
enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 (a)(4)(A». 
5 See Serna, 435 F.3d at 1047-49 (stating that where the record does not contain the 
charging papers, mere possession of a firearm is not a crime of violence). 
6 For purposes of this Note, the terms "crime of violence" and "violent crime" will be used 
interchangeably. 
7 Lynn Hartfield, Feature: Challenging Crime of Violence Sentence Enhancements in 
Federal Court, 30 CHAMPION 28, 28 (2006). 
8 Serna, 435 F.3d at 1046. 
9 [d. at 1047. 
10 See California Penal Code § 12276.1 (defining "assault weapon" to include some 
semiautomatic rifles, semiautomatic pistols with magazines holding more than ten rounds, and 
shotguns with revolving cylinders); see also United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
II See United States v. Serna. 435 F.3d 1046,1049 (9th Cir. 2006). 
12 See id. at 1047. 
13 See id. 
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felon-in-possession offense,14 as defined in California Penal Code § 
12280, does not require proof that the possession occurred in a "context 
prone to violence.,,15 As there was no further information in the record 
regarding Serna's crime, the Ninth Circuit concluded that mere 
possession of an assault weapon did not pose a substantial risk of 
physical injury to another. 16 
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit embarked on an extensive 
analysis of the federal weapons registration requirement. 17 At no point, 
however, did the Ninth Circuit acknowledge what type of weapon Serna 
had pled guilty to possessing. IS Confusingly, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Serna's possession of the unidentified weapon was not a crime of 
violence. 19 This conclusion was based on an analysis of legitimate and 
illegitimate uses of certain weapons, without knowing what weapon to 
scrutinize. 20 
This Note examines the limitations of the strict categorical 
approach; the method by which sentencing courts and courts of review 
determine whether an offense is a crime of violence for sentence 
enhancement purposes.21 Part I of this Note examines the "crime of 
violence" sentence enhancement under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines ("Guidelines,,).22 Part II examines the Ninth Circuit's 
analysis of what constitutes a crime of violence in United States v. 
Serna?3 Part ill proposes that the types of sources available to 
sentencing courts when analyzing whether an offense is a violent crime 
should be expanded based on Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in 
Shepard v. United States.24 Allowing sentencing courts to consider 
uncontradicted evidence will provide them with the means to effectuate 
14 For purposes of this Note, the term "felon-in-possession" will be used to mean the 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 
15 See Serna, 435 F.3d at 1049 (citing United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469,472 (9th Cir. 
1993) (holding that a prison is a context prone to violence because "[tlhe confines of a prison 
preclude any recreational uses for a deadly weapon and render its possession a serious threat to the 
safety of others."). 
16 See id. 
17 See United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047-49 (9th Cir. 2006). 
18 See id. at 1047 (stating that Serna was convicted for possession of "an object"). 
19 [d. at 1049. 
20 See id. at 1047-48. 
21 This Note will not discuss the "crime of violence" analysis pertaining to pre-trial detention 
under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, a, amended by Pub. L. 99-646, 
100 Stat. 3607, and codified at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3141-3150 and 3156 (involving a similar analysis of 
whether the offense is a "crime of violence"). 
22 See infra notes 27-87 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 88-132 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 133-171 and accompanying text. 
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Congress's purpose in enacting federal gun laws, by punishing repeat 
offenders while maintaining the protections afforded to criminal 
defendants under the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.25 Finally, Part IV concludes that the 
proposed expansion of sources will remove arbitrary determinations of 
"crimes of violence" based on missing or incomplete court records, 
leading to more consistent and uniform sentences.26 
1. BACKGROUND 
A. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
1. Purpose of the United States Sentencing Commission and the 
Sentencing Guidelines 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the United States 
Sentencing Commission ("Commission") and authorized the 
Commission to establish and implement sentencing policies for the 
federal criminal justice system. 27 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
"were created in order to reduce judicial discretion, to create more 
uniform sentences for similarly situated offenders, and to promote 
honesty in sentencing. ,,28 Thus, the purpose of the Guidelines was to 
"provide direction as to the appropriate type of punishment-probation, 
fine, or term of imprisonment-and the extent of the punishment 
imposed.,,29 
2. Unlaaful Possession of a Firearm By a Felon Is Not a Violent 
Crime Under the Guidelines 
In Stinson v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the commentary to the Guidelines interprets and explains the 
provisions of the Guidelines, and therefore is authoritative, unless the 
25 See infra notes 143-166 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 172-174 and accompanying text. 
27 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 991 (West 2007) (establishing the Sentencing Commission "as an 
independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States" for the purpose of 28 U.S.C. 
§991(b)(I}, and "establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice 
system."}. 
28 Kendall C. Burman, Comment: Firearm Enhancements under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1055, 1057-58 (2004); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 253 (2005) (holding that "Congress' basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move the 
sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity."). 
29 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36,41 (l993) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(I}(A} and (B)). 
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commentary violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the Guidelines themselves. 3D At issue in 
Stinson was Amendment 433, which added a sentence to the commentary 
to section 4B 1.2 of the Guidelines Manual. 31 Amendment 433 states that 
"[t]he term 'crime of violence' does not include the offense of unlawful 
possession of a fIrearm by a felon.,,32 Thus, the Stinson Court held that 
Amendment 433 was a binding interpretation of the Guidelines' 
defInition of "crime of violence,,,33 and federal courts may not use a 
felon-in-possession offense as a sentence enhancement because it is not a 
crime of violence. 34 
The Stinson Court held that "commentary which functions to 
interpret a [G]uideline or explain how it is to be applied, controls,,,35 and 
failure to consider the commentary "would constitute an incorrect 
application of the [G]uidelines.,,36 In reaching its holding, the Court 
reasoned that "the functional purpose of commentary . . . is to assist in 
the interpretation and application of those rules, which are within the 
Commission's particular area of concern and expertise and which the 
Commission itself has the fIrst responsibility to formulate and 
announce.,,37 As the Commission's interpretation of its own rules, the 
commentary must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly 
erroneous, violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent 
with the regulation. 38 The Stinson Court thus presumed that "the 
interpretations of the [G]uidelines contained in the commentary represent 
the most accurate indications of how the Commission deems that the 
[G]uidelines should be applied to be consistent with the Guidelines 
Manual as a whole as well as the authorizing statute. ,,39 
The Stinson holding has been criticized for increasing the power of 
the Commission beyond Congress's original intent.40 Significantly, 
amendments to the actual Guidelines must fIrst be reviewed by Congress 
30 See id. at 38. 
31 See id. at 39. 
32 U.S.S.G. § 4BI.2 cmt. n.1. 
33 See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 47-48. 
34 See id. at 47. 
35 See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1993) (quoting Williams v. United 
States, 503 U.S. 193,203 (1992». 
36 See id. 
37 1d. at 45. 
38 1d. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945». 
39 See id. at 45. 
40 See Todd L. Newton, Commentary that Binds: The Increased Power of the United States 
Sentencing Commission in Light of Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 19/3 (1993),17 U. ARK 
LrITLERocKLJ. 155,156(1994). 
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for a period of six months before they take effect and have the force of 
law.41 However, the commentary to the Guidelines is not subject to 
Congressional review. 42 The Stinson holding, therefore, allows the 
Commission to change the Guidelines by amending the commentary, 
thus avoiding the Congressional review process.43 Despite this criticism, 
the Stinson holding remains valid, and when applicable, the "Guidelines 
have the force of law."44 
3. Application o/the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Is Advisory and 
Not Mandatory 
When the Guidelines were first implemented, federal courts were 
required to apply the rules promulgated by the Guidelines regarding 
sentencing of persons convicted of federal crimes.45 In 2005, however, 
the United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker that the 
mandatory application of the Guidelines violates the Sixth Amendment 
and is therefore unconstitutional.46 Yet the Booker Court held that the 
Guidelines, while no longer mandatory, must still be consulted and 
considered by the district courts when sentencing based on convictions 
for federal crimes.47 Although the Guidelines are merely advisory, if a 
district court chooses to apply the Guidelines when sentencing, the court 
must consider the commentary to the Guidelines as well.48 In so holding, 
the Booker Court sought to determine Congress's likely intent in 
promulgating the Guidelines in light of the Court's holding that 
mandatory application of the Guidelines was unconstitutional. 49 
If the application of the Guidelines is no longer mandated, then the 
commentary to the Guidelines is also no longer binding on federal 
sentencing courts.50 The district courts are only required to consider the 
Guidelines and commentary to the Guidelines when imposing sentencing 
41 See 28 U.S.C.A § 994(p) (West 2007); see also Newton, supra note 40, at 165. 
42 See Newton, supra note 40, at 164. 
43 [d. 
44 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 324 (2004) (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 
U.S. 36 (1993) (emphasis added». 
45 See 18 U.S.C.A § 3553(b)(l) (West 2007). 
46 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the Sixth Amendment 
requires juries, not judges, to find facts relevant to sentencing determinations). 
47 See id. at 264 (stating that the Sentencing Commission and Guidelines remain in place and 
should be taken into account by district courts when making sentencing determinations). 
48 See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.s. 36, 38 (1993). 
49 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 265. 
50 See id. at 264. 
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based on convictions for federal crimes.51 Thus, the district courts are no 
longer bound by the commentary to the Guidelines, which state that the 
felon-in-possession offense is not a crime of violence. 52 Since Booker, 
courts may analyze the felon-in-possession offense using the well-
established categorical approach in determining whether the felon-in-
possession offense constitutes a crime of violence. 53 
B. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO VIOLENT -CRIME ANALYSIS 
In United States v. Sherbondy, the Ninth Circuit announced a strict 
categorical approach to determining whether a prior offense constitutes a 
"violent felony" for sentence enhancement purposes.54 The strict 
categorical approach provides that a trial court may only look to the fact 
of conviction and to the statutory definition of the crime in order to 
determine whether the offense is a "violent felony" as defined by 18 
U.S.c. § 924(e)(2)(B).55 The Sherbondy strict categorical approach does 
not permit the trial court to inquire into the facts underlying the 
defendant's conviction, such as the specific conduct of the defendant in 
committing the offense. 56 The Sherbondy court restricted the trial court's 
inquiry by limiting the court's analysis to the categories of offenses. 57 
This limitation decreases the possibility of inconsistent adjudication by 
avoiding reliance on subjective factors when determining the 
appropriateness of sentence enhancements. 58 
Three years after the Ninth Circuit's holding in Sherbondy, the 
United States Supreme Court endorsed the categorical approach in 
51 See id. 
52 See infra notes 54-87 and accompanying text. 
53 The majority of jurisdictions apply a categorical approach, rather than a case-by-case 
approach, to determine whether an offense constitutes a "crime of violence." See United States v. 
Singleton, 182 F.3d 7,10 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Carter, 996 F. Supp. 260, 261-62 
(W.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Gloster, 969 F. Supp. 92,94 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v. 
Washington, 907 F. Supp. 476, 484 (D.D.C. 1995); United States v. Aiken, 775 F. Supp. 855, 856 
(D. Md. 199\); United States v. Marzullo, 780 F. Supp. 658, 662 n.8 (W.D. Mo. 1991); United 
States v. Phillips, 732 F. Supp. 255, 261 (D. Mass. 1990); United States v. Johnson, 704 F. Supp. 
1398,1400 (E.D. Mich. 1988». 
54 See United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1009 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying the 
categorical approach to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(8) which defines a "violent felony" as any crime 
punishable by imprisonment for more than a year that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against another or is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use 
of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another). 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 1009 n.17 . 
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Taylor v. United States.59 In Taylor, the Court held that for purposes of 
sentence enhancement, a court should only look to the fact of conviction 
because the statutory definition of the prior conviction determines 
whether the offense is a crime of violence.60 Under Taylor's categorical 
approach, the sentencing court should look only to the language of the 
statute under which the defendant was convicted, and may not inquire 
into the underlying facts of the conviction.61 The Court did, however, 
carve out an exception for the "narrow range of cases where a jury was 
actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary.,,62 In those 
circumstances, the Taylor Court held that a sentencing court may look to 
the charging papers and the jury instructions used to convict the 
defendant in deciding whether the offense is a crime of violence. 63 
The Ninth Circuit has expanded the Taylor exception to allow a 
sentencing court to look to judicially noticeable facts and the judgment 
of conviction, as well as any signed guilty plea and transcript from plea 
proceedings, to determine whether an offense is a violent crime.64 In line 
with this expanded approach, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. 
Sahakian that a sentencing court may look to the elements of the offense 
charged or to the actual charged conduct to determine whether the 
conduct itself posed a serious risk of physical injury to another and was 
therefore a violent crime.65 Applying the expanded categorical approach, 
the Sahakian court held that a felon-in-possession offense was not a 
crime of violence, relying on Amendment 433 and other circuits' similar 
decisions.66 
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court settled any lingering 
issues of what documents a sentencing court may consider when 
determining whether a prior conviction was a violent crime, in Shepard 
v. United States.67 In Shepard, the government sought to introduce 
police reports to determine whether the defendant's prior conviction was 
for "generic burglary," thereby subjecting the defendant to a mandatory 
59 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 600. 
62 See id. at 602. 
63 See id. 
64 See United States v. Etimani, 328 F.3d 493, 503-504 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing numerous 
Ninth Circuit opinions which have expanded the types of documents which may be reviewed under 
the categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States). 
65 See United States v. Sahakian, 965 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1992). 
66 See id. at 742 (citing several other circuits' decisions holding that the felon-in-possession 
offense did not constitute a crime of violence). 
67 Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13,26 (2005). 
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sentence enhancement. 68 The Shepard Court stated that the underlying 
purpose of the Court's decision in Taylor was to avoid situations where 
subsequent courts would hold evidentiary hearings to determine the 
factual basis for earlier convictions.69 Accordingly, the Shepard Court 
held that sentencing courts were limited to the statutory definition, 
charging document, written plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquy, 
and any explicit factual findings assented to by the defendant. 70 
Before Shepard, in United States v. Young, the Ninth Circuit 
announced a two-step approach to determining whether an offense 
constitutes a crime of violence under section 4B1.2 of the Guidelines. 71 
The first step requires looking to the statutory elements of the offense 
charged to determine whether one of the elements of the offense is the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. 72 If the offense 
does not contain such an element, the second step is to determine 
whether the actual charged conduct presented a serious risk of physical 
injury to another.73 This second step restricts the analysis of the offense 
to the conduct charged and convicted.74 The court may look to charging 
papers, indictments, jury instructions, or other facts of which the court 
may take judicial notice.75 In reaching its holding, the Young court 
reasoned that looking to the actual charged conduct "is consistent with 
the directive contained in the Guidelines, which instructs courts to 
consider 'the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged) in the count of 
which the defendant was convicted,' to determine whether that conduct 
'by its nature[] presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another. ",76 However, where the record does not contain the charging 
papers, jury instructions, or verdict forms, the sentencing court must 
adhere to the strict categorical approach outlined in Sherbondy, looking 
only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the offense. 77 
Thus, defendants charged with the same offense could receive different 
68 Id. at 15-16 (stating that the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.c. § 924(e), mandates a 
minimum fifteen-year prison sentence for possession of a firearm after three prior convictions for 
violent felonies, and "makes burglary a violent felony only if committed in a building or enclosed 
space ('generic burglary')."). 
n.2). 
69 Id. at 20. 
70 1d. at 26. 
71 See United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1993). 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.2 emt. 
77 See United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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sentences depending on whether the trial record contains the charging 
papers or indictment. 78 
In United States v. Parker, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of 
lost or destroyed documents.79 According to Parker, a sentencing court 
may not rely upon the charging papers alone when determining whether 
a prior jury conviction constitutes a violent felony.8o Further, the Parker 
court reasoned that the Supreme Court's holding in Taylor requires the 
sentencing court to look only to documents that verify facts actually 
found by the jury.81 Absent such documents, the sentencing court must 
adhere to the Sherbondy categorical approach. 82 
Parker recognized that adherence to the Sherbondy categorical 
approach, in situations where court documents were lost or destroyed, 
may benefit criminal defendants,83 because some convictions that would 
have been considered "violent felonies," had the records been preserved, 
would not count as such after the destruction of the records. 84 However, 
the court chose to adopt an equitable sentencing principle that lessens the 
impact of a conviction over time, by reasoning that the problem of lost or 
destroyed documents will affect primarily older convictions rather than 
recent ones.85 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the passage of time 
should dilute the effect of past conduct on punishment for present acts.86 
Consequently, if a felon is charged with unlawful possession of a 
fIrearm, the decision to enhance the sentence may depend only on 
whether court records were properly kept and maintained, so as to allow 
the sentencing court to determine what type of weapon the defendant was 
carrying.87 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. THE VIOLENT CRIME ANALYSIS IN UNITED STATES V. SERNA 
In Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski's opinion in United States v. Serna, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the possession of an assault weapon is not a 
78 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
79 Parker, 5 F.3d at 1322. 
80 [d. at 1327. 
81 [d. 
82 [d. at 1328. 
83 United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1993). 
84 /d. at 1327-28. 
85 [d. at 1328. 
86 /d. 
87 See infra notes 114-132 and accompanying text. 
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crime of violence for purposes of section 4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines. 88 
Section 4B 1.2(a) of the Guidelines defines a "crime of violence" as "any 
offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year, that ... has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or . . . 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another.,,89 Because mere possession of a weapon does not involve the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another, 
Serna's prior conviction could only constitute a violent crime if the court 
determined that simple possession of an assault weapon "presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.,,90 The court held that 
it did not.91 Serna's prior conviction for possession of an assault 
weapon, therefore, was not considered a crime of violence and could not 
be used to increase his sentence under the Guidelines.92 
1. Inherently Dangerous Weapons Have Few Legitimate Uses 
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit relied on the distinction 
between weapons with legitimate uses and those that have no lawful 
purpose. 93 The court found that "[s]o long as the item in question has 
substantial legitimate uses, its mere possession cannot, without more, 
constitute a crime of violence.,,94 Conversely, "if the universe of uses for 
such an object is largely confined to illegitimate violence, [the court] can 
infer that the object will be used to intimidate or inflict physical injury .. 
. [and therefore, the] illegal possession of such [an object] ... is a crime 
of violence.,,95 The Ninth Circuit used this "legitimate purposes" test to 
distinguish "ordinary firearms" from silencers and sawed-off shotguns.96 
The court cited sporting and self-defense as examples of legitimate 
purposes.97 "Unlike an ordinary firearm, [silencers and sawed-off 
shotguns are not] likely to serve any sporting or self-defense purpose. 
Thus, we have held that they 'are inherently dangerous, lack usefulness 
88 United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006). 
89 See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). 
90 Serna, 435 F.3d at 1047 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a». 
91 ld. at 1049. 
92 ld. 
93 [d. at 1048. 
94 United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006). 
95 [d. at 1047-48 (citing United States v. Delaney, 427 F.3d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Hayes, 7 F.3d 144, 145 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Huffuines, 967 F.2d 314, 
320-21 (9th Cir. 1992». 
% Serna, 435 F.3d at 1048. 
97 [d. 
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except for violent and criminal purposes and their possession involves 
the substantial risk of improper physical force. ",98 Therefore, the key 
determination is whether an assault weapon is more like an ordinary 
fIrearm, or more like a silencer or sawed-off shotgun.99 Because 
silencers and sawed-off shotguns are required by Congress to be 
registered, and assault weapons are not, the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
assault weapons are more like ordinary fIrearms. loo The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that possession of assault weapons does not pose a substantial 
risk of physical injury, and therefore, Serna's prior conviction for 
possession of a fIrearm is not a crime of violence. 101 
2. Inherently Dangerous Weapons Must Be Registered 
The Ninth Circuit also found that Serna's prior state-court 
conviction was not a crime of violence on the ground that Congress did 
not require semiautomatic weapons to be registered. 102 The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that since Congress did not require semiautomatic weapons to 
be registered, they are not inherently dangerous and do not pose a risk of 
physical injury. 103 According to the Ninth Circuit, "[t]he registration 
requirement reflect [ s] Congress's determination that certain weapons are 
almost certain to be used for unlawful purposes."I04 Thus, according to 
the Ninth Circuit, if Congress requires a weapon to be registered, the 
weapon is considered to have few, if any, legitimate uses. lOS Conversely, 
if Congress does not require a weapon to be registered, the weapon has 
legitimate uses and is less likely to be used unlawfully. 106 
The Serna court also cited United States v. Brazeau, in which the 
Seventh Circuit held that "most firearms do not have to be registered-
only those that Congress found to be inherently dangerous.,,107 Thus, if 
Congress did not require the weapon to be registered, the weapon had 
some lawful use and was less likely "to lead to unlawful violence than 
98 [d. at 1048 (citing United States v. Delaney, 427 F.3d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
United States v. Hayes, 7 F.3d 144, 145 (9th Cir. 1993». 
99 United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006). 
100 [d. at 1049. 
101 [d. 
102 See id. at 1048 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5845 as the comprehensive list of weapons that are 
required to be registered). 
103 See id. at 1048 (citing United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Brazeau, 237 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001». 
104 United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006). 
105 [d. 
106 [d. 
107 /d. at 1048 (quoting United States v. Brazeau, 237 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001». 
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[the weapons required to be registered].,,108 The Ninth Circuit held that 
because Congress has never placed a "blanket registration requirement" 
on semiautomatic weapons, mere possession of a semiautomatic weapon 
does not pose a significant risk of physical injury, and therefore, mere 
possession is not a crime of violence. 109 
With the introduction of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress made the possession of some 
semiautomatic weapons a federal crime. 110 The Act placed a ten-year ban 
on possession of assault weapons. III However, Congress allowed the ban 
to lapse without requiring the registration of previously banned 
weapons. 1I2 The Ninth Circuit found that because the current federal 
policy considers assault weapons to be on "the same footing as other 
non-registrable weapons," mere possession of these assault weapons, 
without more, cannot constitute a crime of violence. 113 
B. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STRICT CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO 
VIOLENT -CRIME ANALYSIS 
The Serna opinion illustrates an important issue regarding the 
current structure for analyzing whether an offense is a violent crime. 
Due to the restrictions placed on the Ninth Circuit by the strict 
categorical approach, the Serna court applied the registration 
requirement and legitimate uses test to generic semiautomatic weapons 
without any information regarding the specific type of weapon possessed 
by Serna. 1I4 However, a sentencing court cannot truly be assured that 
mere possession of a weapon is not a crime of violence without actually 
knowing what type of weapon the defendant possessed. 115 
The Serna court found that even objects that are designed to be 
lethal may have legitimate uses. 116 In the court's opinion, "[s]o long as 
the object in question has substantial legitimate uses, its mere possession 
lOS [d. 
109 United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006). 
110 [d. at 1048 (citing Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-322 (lapsed 2004». 
III See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 
(lapsed 2004). 
112 Serna, 435 F.3d at 1049. 
113 [d. 
114 See United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046,1047 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that Serna's prior 
conviction was for possession of an "object"). 
115 See infra notes 123-125 and accompanying text. 
116 Serna, 435 F.3d at 1047. 
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cannot, without more, constitute a crime of violence.',ll7 In addition, the 
court found that semiautomatic weapons were never subject to a blanket 
registration requirement,118 which suggests that mere possession of such 
weapons does not pose the same risk of physical injury as those weapons 
that are subject to blanket registration requirements. 119 Although the 
context in which the possession occurs may constitute a crime of 
violence in and of itself,120 nothing in the California Penal Code section 
12280 requires proof that the possession occurred in a context prone to 
violence. 121 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that without more 
information about Serna's particular offense, mere possession of an 
I . . f' I 122 assau t weapon is not a cnme 0 Vl0 ence. 
According to the Guidelines,123 the felon-in-possession offense is 
not a crime of violence unless the flrearm falls under the definition of 
"flrearm" in 26 U.S.c. § 5845(a).124 This means that in a case of mere 
possession of a firearm by a felon, the specific type of weapon possessed 
can be determinative of whether the possession offense is a violent 
crime. 125 However, under the strict categorical approach outlined in 
Sherbondy and Taylor, the sentencing court is not permitted to inquire as 
to the specific facts underlying the conviction. 126 Therefore, if the 
statutory deflnition of the possession offense does not contain an element 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 1048. 
119 See id. at 1049. 
120 United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing the possession of 
melted-down shaving razors in prison to be a "crime of violence" because of the inherent danger of 
possessing such items in the context of a prison environment). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See U.S.S.G. § 4BI.2 n.1 (stating that a "[c]rime of violence does not include the offense 
of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, unless the possession was of a firearm described in 
26 U.S.C. § 5845(a». 
124 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) defines a ''fuearm'' to include sawed-off shotguns, machineguns, 
weapons with silencers, and destructive devices. 
125 While most jurisdictions have held that mere possession of a fuearm is not a crime of 
violence, various jurisdictions have held that possession of a firearm combined with certain conduct 
does constitute a "crime of violence." See Mary E. McDowell, The Importance of Structural 
Analysis in Guideline Application, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 112 (2002) (citing United States v. Williams, 
892 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. McNeal, 900 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Walker, 930 F.2d 789 (lOth Cir. 1991); United States v. Goodman, 914 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Cornelius, 931 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1991). 
126 See United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1009 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying the 
categorical approach to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), which defines a "violent felony" as any crime 
punishable by imprisonment for more than a year that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against another or is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use 
of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). 
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of physical force, and if the record is silent as to the type of weapon 
possessed, the Parker holding restricts the sentencing court's analysis to 
h · . I h 127 t e stnct categonca approac . 
Under the Sherbondy strict categorical approach to the possession 
offense with which Serna was charged,128 the offense could not be 
considered a crime of violence under section 4B 1.2(a)(l) of the 
Guidelines because the statute did not have as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another. 129 In addition, because the record did not contain any 
information regarding the type of assault weapon unlawfully possessed 
by Serna, or the context in which the possession occurred, the court was 
limited to the strict categorical approach. 130 Lastly, because the record 
did not contain the charging papers or any explicit factual findings by the 
trial judge, under Shepard the Ninth Circuit could not consider any 
information other than the statutory definition of the offense. 131 
Therefore, regardless of how dangerous the weapon was that Serna was 
found in possession of, his sentence could not be enhanced under 
Sherbondy's strict categorical approach. 132 
Ill. ExpANDING THE AVAILABLE SOURCES TO GUIDE THE VIOLENT 
CRIME ANALYSIS 
The determination of whether a prior felon-in-possession conviction 
constitutes a crime of violence may hinge on what information is 
available in the record for the consideration of the sentencing court. 133 
This determination can have a significant impact on the length of a 
criminal sentence. l34 In the interests of justice and accurate sentencing, 
such an important determination should not turn on whether the state 
properly kept and maintained court records. 
127 See United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1993). 
128 Cal. Pen. Code § I 2280(b) (2006). 
129 See Cal. Penal Code § 12280(a) (2006) (prohibiting the manufacture, distribution, sale, or 
possession of any assault weapon). 
130 See United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying United States v. 
Young, 990 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1993». 
131 See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005). 
132 See United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1993) (restricting the sentencing 
court's analysis to the statutory definition of the crime and to the conduct "expressly charged" in the 
indictment); see also Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16 (limiting the sentencing court's examination to "the 
statutory definition [of the offense], charging document[s], written plea agreement[s], transcript[s] of 
plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented."). 
133 See supra notes 114-132 and accompanying text. 
134 See Serna, 435 F.3d at 1047 (applying the sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
2K2.1 (a)(4)(A». 
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A. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENTING OPINION IN SHEPARD V. UNITED 
STATES 
The current case law in the Ninth Circuit restricts sentencing courts 
to a categorical analysis of the statutory offense and limits the inquiry to 
the charging papers, jury instructions, and judicially noticeable facts. 135 
Because these restrictions can result in arbitrary sentencing based on 
missing court records and analysis of generic weapons,136 sentencing 
courts and courts of review should be allowed to employ a more flexible 
approach based on Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Shepard v. 
United States. 137 
In Shepard, the majority restricted the sentencing court's analysis to 
the statutory definition of the offense and judicially noticeable facts. 138 
The Court rejected the government's contention that a sentencing court 
should be permitted to look to police reports and complaint 
applications. 139 Criticizing the majority opinion as one that 
"substantially frustrate[s] Congress' scheme for punishing repeat violent 
offenders who violate federal gun laws,',I40 Justice O'Connor's· 
dissenting opinion suggested that a sentencing court's analysis should be 
expanded to include "any uncontradicted, internally consistent parts of 
the record from the earlier conviction.,,141 Under this expanded list of 
sources, a sentencing court would be allowed to consider police reports 
and complaint applications for uncontradicted facts regarding the prior 
conviction. 142 
B. THREE REASONS TO EXPAND THE AVAILABLE SOURCES TO 
INCLUDE POLICE REpORTS AND UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE 
1. Effectuating the Purpose of Federal Gun Laws 
Restricting the sentencing court's analysis to the statutory definition 
and charging documents frustrates Congress's underlying purpose in 
enacting federal gun laws: to punish repeat violent offenders. 143 The 
135 See United States v. Parker,S F.3d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1993). 
136 See supra notes 79-132 and accompanying text. 
137 See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 28 (2005) (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
138 1d. at 16. 
139 See id. at 23. 
140 Id. at 28 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
141 Id. at 31 (2005) (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
142 1d. 
143 See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 35 (2005) (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., 
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current restrictions placed on sentencing courts force these courts to 
ignore relevant and uncontradicted evidence regarding prior convictions 
and allow defendants to benefit from the unavailability of court 
records. l44 As Justice O'Connor stated, the sentencing court should not 
be forced to "feign agnosticism about clearly knowable facts.,,145 A 
defendant's sentence should not depend on whether a State's "record 
retention policies happen to preserve the musty 'written plea agreements' 
and recordings of 'plea colloquies' ancillary to long-past convictions."I46 
2. Expanding the Sources to Include Uncontradicted Evidence Does 
Not Violate the Constitution 
Allowing sentencing courts to consider clear and uncontradicted 
evidence written in police reports does not run afoul of any due process 
rights or the right to a jury trial as provided by the Constitution. 147 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the trial judge conducted an evidentiary 
hearing following a guilty plea. 148 The judge concluded that the evidence 
supported a finding that the crime was motivated by racial bias, thereby 
enhancing Apprendi' s sentence above the statutory maximum. 149 The 
United States Supreme Court reversed the sentence, holding that under 
the Sixth Amendment, any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
that increases the sentence beyond the statutory maximum, must be 
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 150 
Four years later, in Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court 
affIrmed the Apprendi ruling and held a Washington State sentencing 
procedure unconstitutional because it allowed judges to determine facts 
dissenting). 
144 See id. at 29 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
145 [d. at 35 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
146 [d. at 36-37 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
147 U.S. CONST. amend. XiV. (providing that "[no State shalll deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law."); U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (providing that "[iln all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."); see Shepard, 544 U.S. 
at 37-38 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
148 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,470 (2000). 
149 [d. at 471 (increasing Apprendi's sentence from a maximum of twenty years to a 
maximum of thirty years). 
ISO U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (providing that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed."); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (finding a New Jersey hate crime 
statute unconstitutional because it authorized a judge to increase the maximum sentence by finding 
aggravating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence). 
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that gave rise to sentences above the statutory maximum. 151 In Blakely, 
the trial judge sentenced the defendant to three years above the 
maximum standard range based on a finding that he had acted with 
deliberate cruelty in kidnapping his estranged wife. 152 
In Cunningham v. California, decided in 2007, the Court struck 
down California's determinate sentencing law because it authorized a 
judge, rather than a jury, to find facts allowing the imposition of an 
upper-term sentence. 153 In Cunningham, the trial judge found six 
aggravating circumstances, including the vulnerability of the victim and 
that Cunningham's violent conduct posed a serious danger to the 
community.l54 As a result, Cunningham was sentenced to the upper-term 
limit of sixteen years. 155 
Although the Supreme Court has continued to apply the Apprendi 
rule requiring juries, not judges, to determine facts that give rise to 
sentences above the statutory maximum,156 the Court has also held that 
"when a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial 
sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the 
relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding.,,157 In the same vein, 
unchallenged factual determinations in prior convictions, made with 
procedural safeguards attached, mitigate any due process or Sixth 
Amendment concerns "otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to 
determine a 'fact' increasing punishment beyond the [statutory] 
maximum." 158 As such, where facts are admitted in a guilty plea, and 
those facts are uncontradicted during sentencing, the sentencing court 
should be free to examine those facts during sentencing without running 
afoul of the Constitution. 
Allowing sentencing courts to examine police reports for 
uncontradicted facts is also outside the applicable scope of the Apprendi, 
Blakely, and Cunningham holdings, as those cases dealt with a judicial 
determination of the subjective intent of the defendant, rather than 
objective facts. 159 The facts found in Cunningham were "neither inherent 
151 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004) (holding that Washington's 
sentencing procedure did not comply with the Sixth Amendment). 
152 [d. at 303. 
153 Cunningham v. California, No. 05-6551, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1324, at *43 (Jan. 22, 2007). 
154 [d. at *13. 
155/d. at *11. 
156 [d. at *24. 
157 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004). 
158 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 u.s. 466, 488 (2000) (distinguishing Apprendi from 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)). 
159 See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text. 
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in the jury's verdict nor embraced by the defendant's plea."I60 When a 
defendant pleads guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm, the defendant 
must necessarily be admitting to possessing the firearm that he was 
charged with possessing. As in Apprendi, Blakely, and Cunningham, the 
defendant may challenge any determinations made by the judge as to the 
defendant's subjective intent in possessing the fIrearm, 161 but by pleading 
guilty to the possession offense, the defendant must admit to possessing 
the particular fIrearm. 
In order to determine what weapon the defendant pled guilty to 
possessing, a judge would not have to conduct any additional or 
independent factfinding, or any subjective analysis of previously found 
facts. A sentencing court could simply look to the police report to 
determine the type of weapon that the defendant was charged with and 
later pled guilty to possessing. If the defendant wanted to challenge the 
weapon determination, the defendant could do so under the sentence 
appeal procedures already in place. 162 
When considering police reports to determine what type of weapon 
the defendant pled guilty to possessing, the main concern of the 
sentencing court should be the fairness to the defendant. However, 
"there is nothing unfair (and a great deal that is positively just) about 
recognizing and acting upon plain and uncontradicted evidence that a 
defendant, in entering his prior plea, knew [what] he was being 
prosecuted for and was pleading guilty to.,,163 So long as the prior 
conviction and guilty plea were established through procedures satisfying 
the fair-notice, reasonable-doubt, and jury-trial guarantees, the 
sentencing court should not be prevented from considering evidence that 
the defendant did not contest, and that formed the basis of the guilty plea. 
3. Allowing Uncontradicted Evidence Will Not Impose Any Additional 
Burden on Sentencing Courts 
Taylor itself did not establish rules for cases involving guilty pleas 
and the list of available sources for the sentencing courts provided by the 
Taylor exception was not intended to be exhaustive. l64 Allowing 
sentencing courts to consider police reports and uncontradicted evidence 
is consistent with Taylor's central purpose, which was to effectuate 
160 Cunningham v. California. No. 05-6551, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1324, at *11 (Jan. 22, 2007). 
161 See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text. 
162 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(j) (providing for a defendant's right to appeal and requiring the 
court to advise the defendant of that right to appeal after sentencing). 
163 Shepard v. United States. 544 U.S. 13,36 (2005) (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
164 See id. 
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Congress's categorical approach to sentencing. 165 Furthermore, allowing 
sentencing courts to consider police reports and uncontradicted evidence 
does not run afoul of Taylor's other purpose of avoiding "the 
impracticality of mini-sentencing-trials featuring opposing witnesses 
perusing lengthy transcripts of prior proceedings."I66 Consideration of 
uncontradicted and undisputed evidence, which form the basis for the 
defendant's guilty plea, would not lead to any need for opposing 
witnesses or submission of counter-evidence. 
C. APPLYING THE EXPANDED SOURCES TO SERNA'S CASE 
An examination of the police report and complaint application for 
uncontradicted facts may have led to a different outcome in Serna, but 
surely an examination of such documents would lead to less arbitrary and 
more consistent results when analyzing felon-in-possession convictions 
as crimes of violence. Under the current framework of analysis, the 
sentencing court must first look to the statutory definition of the offense 
to determine whether the offense contains an element of the use of 
force. 167 If the offense does not contain such an element, the court must 
determine whether the actual charged conduct presented a serious risk of 
physical injury to another. 168 If the defendant was found guilty by a 
judge or jury, the sentencing court may look to the charging papers, jury 
instructions, and explicit factual findings to determine whether the actual 
charged conduct presented a serious risk of physical injury to another. 169 
Under an analysis incorporating the use of uncontradicted evidence, 
when the defendant pled guilty to the felon-in-possession offense, the 
sentencing court may look to the sources stated above, as well as the 
police report and complaint applications, to determine what type of 
weapon the defendant pled guilty to possessing. 
If sentencing courts were allowed to look to the uncontradicted 
factual evidence contained in the police report, courts of review would 
not be forced to engage in an unnecessary analysis of registration 
requirements and illegitimate uses of unspecified objects. 170 Sentencing 
165 See id. at 36 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, 1., dissenting) (stating that "[tlhe issue most central 
to Taylor was the need to effectuate Congress' 'categorical approach' to sentencing recidivist federal 
offenders-an approach which responds to the reality of a defendant's prior crimes, rather than the 
happenstance of how those crimes 'were labeled by state law."'). 
166 [d. at 36 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, 1., dissenting) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 
575,601 (1990». 
167 See United States v. Young, 990 F.2d469, 471 (9th Cir. 1993). 
168 See id. 
169 See id. 
170 See United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046,1047-48 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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courts and courts of review could instead look to the statutory definition 
of the possession offense to determine whether the language of the 
statute contains an element of force, and then look to the uncontradicted 
evidence to determine what type of weapon was illegally possessed, if 
such information was not found in the trial record. If the sentencing 
court knew what type of weapon Serna possessed, it could have more 
adequately determined whether possession of such a weapon posed a 
serious risk of physical injury to another. Such certainty would create a 
more uniform application of the Guidelines in deciding the length of a 
sentence in felon-in-possession situations. 171 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The proposed expansion of sources to aid the analysis of the felon-
in-possession offense as a violent crime should be narrowly applied to 
cases where the defendant pled guilty to the possession offense and the 
type of weapon possessed is missing from the trial court's record. 172 
Properly applied, this analysis will relieve sentencing courts from having 
to conduct time-consuming examinations of weapons registration 
requirements and illegitimate uses for unspecified weapons. 173 
Furthermore, the proposed expansion of sources will remove the 
arbitrary determination of "crimes of violence" based on missing or 
incomplete court records, leading to more consistent and uniform 
sentences. 174 
171 See id. at 1047. 
172 See supra notes 156·163 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra notes 123-171 and accompanying text. 
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